Although the title sounds like something a cold warrior or Russian emigré might have written, nothing could be further from the truth. Volkogonov was in fact a Soviet general who during the seventies and eighties had access to classified archives in the normal course of his duties, and who later declassified literally thousands of documents for access to historians and the general public. In the nineties he was for a while advisor to Boris Yeltsin. He died in 1997 after illness. What makes his account all the more poignant is that he lived through many of the events described in the book, and thus the account is not only of the decline and death of the Soviet system but also of Volkogonov's awaking doubts and ultimately his rejection of Marxist-Leninism, not for the free markets and materialism of the West (though he came to favour free enterprise) but for the Christian faith of his forefathers.
Volkogonov's plan is a simple one: he describes the history of the USSR through the lives and personalities of its seven leaders, from Lenin to Gorbachev, and how they first dictated and then came to be dictated by the course of events as the century unfolded. He acknowledges in his foreword that this is not a perfect scheme, but it is nevertheless an illuminating one. Again, the author met and knew the last five Party leaders, quite well from Andropov onwards.
Perhaps from a Soviet point of view the most distressing part of Volkogonov's book is his history of Lenin, whom he criticises harshly, both as a personality and for his decisions. The founder of the USSR, practically deified in the history of the country, is shown as a man who knew and cared little about the depths of the human personality and who pursued his goal with ruthless single-mindedness, being ready to stoop to any level to achieve his aims. Volkogonov also reveals the true scale of the squandering of Soviet resources in the pursuit of achieving world revolution, with millions of pounds in gold and other valuables being dished out willy-nilly to anyone coming to Moscow to offer their services. Lenin is portrayed as something of an automaton, and his closest associates, such as Zinoviev and Kamenev, almost ciphers of his own personality. This first chapter of the book is critical to understanding the rest, since Lenin effectively created the new state in his own image.
Stalin's condemnation in contrast seems somewhat mitigated by the circumstances of his early years and the fact that he set out to be a loyal disciple of Lenin, the pupil simply emulating the master of revolutionary intrigue, duplicity and violence. Volkogonov does not spare the dictator for his ruthlessness, particularly his callous waste of Soviet lives during the Second World War, but notes the young Djugashvili's brutal upbringing (his father, a cobbler, often drank and beat the boy and his mother), and, eerily, the fact that during his early years in seminary he was considered a fine scholar, well able to memorise New Testament verses. Unfortunately, by the time he left seminary under a cloud all he took with him was a dogmatic turn of mind. Even the Terror of the Thirties, however, is according to Volkogonov explicable not just by Stalin's inherent paranoia but also as a logical extension of Lenin's politics. Only a glimmer of light is seen in Stalin's old age, when in his private life he showed a little humanity, although characteristically his last coherent night on earth shows him in a sudden rage. In a frightening scene around the dinner table he suddenly demands of his associates why he has to think of everything, and declares that without the Gulag nothing would get done. Shortly after storming off to his apartment he suffered an aneurysm from which he never recovered, despite the best efforts of the frightened doctors. The death bed narrative is in some ways as sickly and grotesque as Hitler's last days in the bunker, with frightened or ambitious men trying to decide their next move as the dictator's life slips away. The outcome was, of course, the elimination of Beria, although Volkogonov notes that ironically the secret police chief might have been edging towards an easing of the domestic atmosphere.
The remaining five Party leaders were not the iron-willed, iron-fisted leaders of the same type, although Volkogonov still devotes considerable attention to them. Krushchev is commended for his attempts to break Stalin's legacy of terror, although the author notes that even then none of the Party had the courage to face up to the fact that Beria or Stalin was not the ultimate cause of the horror, but rather Lenin and his ideals. In fact most of Krushchev's plans and reforms went awry, sometimes disastrously so, culminating in the world peering into the abyss during the Cuban missile crisis. Brezhnev was more welcome to the party bureaucrats, although he trembled at the thought of seizing power. Volkogonov acknowledges that Brezhnev had certain decent qualities, especially during his early years, being more of a consensus man, but notes that intellectually he was simply not up to the job, in some ways resembling the conservative Tsar Nicholas I. It was also during this time that the USSR was drawn into Afghan politics, with tragic circumstances for both nations: Volkogonov's notes here are revealing. From the late Seventies onwards Soviet society began to suffer its inexorable decline, which neither Brezhnev nor his successors could stop. Andropov's reign was too short for him to make a mark, although Volkogonov suspects that his policy of more discipline and socialist consciousness, while appealing to older people, would not have made much difference. Interestingly, he quotes some of the rather bleak and nihilistic poetry left behind by the former KGB chairman. Chernenko's accession to power is in some ways portrayed as a cruel farce, since the former border guard and "clerk to the party" had neither the intellectual power nor by then the physical health to be the leader of such a great nation, still less to deal with the pressing issues of his day. In any event he lasted about a year.
About Mikhail Gorbachev Volkogonov is firm but fair. He dispels some of the romantic myths about the last chairman of the Soviet Communist Party, showing that even upon his accession the youngest Soviet leader was at least outwardly committed to Bolshevism, the cult of Lenin and the saving of the contemporary form of society, and that in this essentially Gorbachev was pulling in two opposite directions at once. He also notes Gorbachev's occasional outbursts of barrack-room language, his slandering of opponents, whether Reagan or Yeltsin, and the mutual hypnotic fascination he had with the West. At the same time he pays tribute to Gorbachev's acknowledgement of the need for change, his reduction of the tensions of the Cold War and his attempts to reduce the near-deification of the Soviet leadership, and recognises him as the best of the seven Soviet leaders.
Those reading this book hoping for a blanket justification of the West's policies during the Cold War may feel vindicated, but only up to a point. Volkogonov seems to strive for fairness and truth on every page, and thus for example acknowledges that during times of great crisis or war the centralised command economy worked well, while he points out that a post-Soviet Russian Government commission cleared the Soviet air defences of blame for the shooting down of the Korean airliner in 1983 and that US conduct in the matter left a good deal to be desired. (What was wrong in his eyes was the Kremlin's attempts to brazen it out to save face). He also claims that a system of social democracy would have worked better for the Russian Federal Republic than the unfettered free market that it has become. Still, the West is only dealt with as much as it impinges upon the life of the USSR. Admirers of the Russian people and those who wish to understand the past will find much of interest and profit in this very readable tome.
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